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information? 
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Abstract 
To simplify decision making processes, online platforms frequently display reputation star ratings as an 
indication of the quality of a product, service, or organization. Can information provided by such star ratings 
draw away attention from other information? This is an important question for platform developers to adjust 
the use of such ratings. We conduct a between-subjects laboratory experiment (n = 121) where we 
manipulate the difference between the reputation star ratings of two social profit organizations, and ask 
respondents to indicate which organization they prefer. Applying eye-tracking technology, we analyze how 
the visual attention between the treatment conditions differs. Our findings show that reputation star ratings 
are consulted as complementary information, rather than as substitute information. Moreover, the results 
suggest that the lack of stars – not the presence of more stars – attracts visual attention. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Decision making based on reputation star ratings 
has become a substantial part of our personal and 
professional lives (Yang, Hu, & Zhang, 2007). 
When booking a hotel, buying a book, choosing a 
movie, or selecting a restaurant on one of many 
online platforms, information is often given in the 
form of reputation ratings that indicate how other 
users and/or external specialists have rated the 
product or service (Jøsang, Ismail, Audun, & 
Boyd, 2007; Zacharia, Moukas, & Maes, 2000). 
These reputation ratings are often presented 
visually, by colored stars or checkboxes, making 
them easy to identify and interpret. Such 
reputation ratings – which we refer to in this study 
as reputation star ratings – have gained great 
importance since the development of the Internet 
and especially the Web 2.0 and 3.0 revolutions. 
Despite the fact that reputation star ratings can 
provide information that may ease decisions in an 
overloaded information society, their derivation 
and underlying content is often is often — either 
intentionally or unintentionally — nontransparent 
(Zhang, 2006).   
In this study, we start from the assumption that 
this reputation information can be interpreted as 
substitute or as complementary information 
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compared to other available, non-reputation 
information. If reputation star information is 
perceived as substitute information, a 
disadvantage might be that differences in such 
ratings between two comparable objects mask 
other information or draw away attention from 
other information that could also be relevant for 
particular people and/or in particular contexts. 
Decision makers might neglect or ignore other 
information, particularly in a setting where 
reputation star ratings show a substantially clear 
difference between objects. Only when the 
reputation star ratings perfectly summarize the 
other information, if even possible, such 
substituting tendency could indeed make the 
information search and decision process more 
efficient.  
In contrast, decision makers might interpret 
reputation star ratings as additional or 
complementary information to other available 
non-reputation related information. This means 
that differences in reputation star ratings are just 
a part of all available information, and in fact 
could potentially even trigger more attention to 
other relevant information and result in a more 
thorough decision making process. However, if 
reputation star information is meant to summarize 
the other available information, a consultation 
process, in which it is considered as 
complementary information, might take longer 
than necessary. Considering these contrasting 
perceptions of the role of reputation star ratings 
in comparison to other available information, it is 
relevant for decision system developers to know 
how such simple star ratings influence visual 
attention patterns to reputation star ratings, but 
also to other available information. The question 
is thus: Are reputation star ratings consulted as 
complementary or as substitute information by 
decision makers? Or in other words, does a 
difference in reputation star ratings draw away 
attention from non-reputation information? 
Answering this question can give insight into 
how reputation star ratings influence information 
consultation patterns. This can help decision 
system developers adjust their use of reputation 
star ratings, depending on their intended purpose 
with respect to providing reputation star ratings 
as a part of all available information.  
We conducted a laboratory experiment involving 
eye-tracking analysis to answer this question. In 
a situation where decision makers compare two 
objects to indicate which they like most, we test 
how a clear difference in stars influences the 
overall visual attention pattern, compared to a 
situation where there is no difference in stars. Our 
design reflects a simplified setting of the more 
complex comparisons that often happen in daily 
life. We designed a two-group between-subjects 
experiment in which participants compare only 
two objects. We manipulated only the difference 
in stars between treatment groups, and kept 
constant all other potential factors that can 
influence visual attention. This allows us to test 
an important potential effect of reputation star 
ratings with more statistical power and internal 
validity (Orquin & Holmqvist, 2018). Our design 
gives an initial, preliminary answer to our 
research question, and it opens potential avenues 
for further research. 
We identified eye-tracking analysis as a relevant 
method for our research question, given its value 
in analyzing visual attention on a granular level 
(Schall & Bergstrom, 2014; Shojaeizadeh, 
Djamasbi, Paffenroth, & Trapp, 2018). As our 
main variable of interest is visual attention to 
different pieces of information, eye-tracking 
analysis can provide relatively high-quality 
observational data from decision makers. For this 
research, it is important that eye-tracking is 
unobtrusive, accurate in capturing attention to 
visual stimuli, and provides an objective 
measurement of visual patterns, as opposed to 
potential subjectivity and exposure to other biases 
in other types of methods (Djamasbi, 2014; 
Djamasbi & Hall-Phillips, 2014; Liu, Djamasbi, 
Trapp, & Shojaeizadeh, 2018). A substantial 
body of literature has been developed on how this 
fine-grained visual attention to specific pieces of 
information is related to concrete decisions based 
on the information provided (for an overview see 
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, 2017). The main focus 
here, however, is not on the relationship between 
visual attention and the actual decision, but on 
how a particular type of information (reputation 
star ratings) influences the overall attention 
pattern, which is crucial in the overall decision 
process. 
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In this study we contribute first to the general 
understanding of how users consult star rating 
information, building on previous observational 
and experimental research on reputation, advice, 
and decision-making (Dalal & Bonaccio, 2010; 
Fuller, Serva, & Benamati, 2007; Kim, Ferrin, & 
Rao, 2008; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988; Yaniv & 
Kleinberger, 2000). This study takes a user-
centered and behavioral approach to understand 
how heuristic information signals in online 
markets and platforms influence perceived 
quality and reputation (Fuller et al., 2007; Kim et 
al., 2008; Qi, Footer, Camerer, & Mobbs, 2018).  
As a second main contribution, this study tests a 
specific guidance design feature in a common 
decision support system (Morana, Schacht, 
Scherp, & Maedche, 2017). Guidance design 
features are any technical or behavioral features 
that can help decision makers in their decision 
(for an extensive overview and taxonomy of 
guidance design features, we refer to Morana et 
al. 2017). From that perspective, we provide an 
example for other studies to continue to explore 
how different rating systems, as a particular form 
of a guidance design feature, can support decision 
making (Dalal & Bonaccio, 2010; Karimi & 
Wang, 2017; Morana et al. 2017). 
Third, this study answers the call for the 
application of more innovative research methods 
and approaches to better understand decision 
processes that are guided by decision support 
systems, and reputation rating systems in 
particular (Fehrenbacher & Djamasbi, 2017; 
Tadelis, 2016). 
BACKGROUND - REPUTATION STAR 
RATINGS AS COGNITIVE SIGNALS 
Reputation star ratings often form the crucial 
control and trust mechanisms in secondary 
exchange or ‘sharing economy’ applications, 
such as AirBnB and Uber (Muchahari & Sinha, 
2018). Similarly, such star ratings are also 
increasingly used (Banerjee, Bhattacharyya, & 
Bose, 2017; Fombrun, 2007) to assess the 
investment-worthiness of crowdfunded startup 
projects (e.g. Kickstarter, Indiegogo), the impact 
of charities or social profit organizations 
(e.g. Charity Navigator, Better Business Bureau 
Wise Giving Alliance), the attractiveness of 
universities (e.g. US News and World Report, 
Shanghai Ranking/Academic Ranking of World 
Universities), or the impact of scientists 
(e.g. Scopus and ResearchGate). 
A substantial body of interdisciplinary literature 
has been developed on reputation star ratings and 
decisions (Chen, Zheng, Xu, Liu, & Wang, 2018; 
Zhou, Dresner, & Windle, 2008). Reputation star 
ratings function as important signals that can 
influence to varying degrees our cognition of the 
perceived value of several objects, such as 
products, services, organizations, and people 
(George, Dahlander, Graffin, & Sim, 2016). With 
this study, we build on literature that has focused 
on the relation between available information and 
how it is presented on the one hand, and a 
decision maker’s decision on the other. Given the 
prevalence of information presented online, the 
process of discerning information available on 
websites is a cognitive one. This process can be 
influenced by design, text, and graphics through 
a visual hierarchy of information, with graphical 
representations and imagery used to draw 
attention to a specific area, in preference over text 
(Faraday, 2000; Grier, Kortum, & Miller, 2007; 
Djamasbi, Siegel, & Tullis, 2012).  
These earlier studies have shown the strong 
relationship between visual attention to 
information and actual decisions. However, there 
is scant research that shows how a particular type 
of information might influence the visual 
attention pattern to all available information, 
which can affect the final decision. To improve 
our understanding of the potential influence of 
reputation star ratings on the distribution of visual 
attention to all available information, our 
hypotheses and analyses focus on the relationship 
between what a reputation star rating is reporting 
(i.e. different amount of stars versus equal 
amount of stars), and the visual attention to that 
information as well as to other, non-reputation 
information.  
HYPOTHESES: DO DIFFERENCES IN 
STAR RATINGS DRAW AWAY 
ATTENTION FROM OTHER 
INFORMATION? 
With respect to cognitive information search and 
process patterns, findings are often summarized 
in two types of processes: top-down and bottom-
up control of attention (Orquin, Ashby, & Clarke, 
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2016; Orquin, Bagger, & Loose, 2013; Orquin & 
Loose, 2013; Theeuwes, 2010). Top-down 
control describes active attention patterns that are 
intentional and goal related, for example when a 
person is given a very particular task with respect 
to the information provided, or when motivation 
for the task is high (Orquin et al., 2013; 
Theeuwes, 2010). Bottom-up control is attention-
grabbing or stimuli-driven, meaning that the 
formatting of the information (e.g. text size, 
color, or logo contrast with background) draws 
the initial passive attention of a person. Extensive 
empirical evidence suggests that initial attention 
to newly presented information is completely 
driven by bottom-up control, but over time (in as 
little as a matter of milliseconds) top-down 
control takes over  (Theeuwes, 2010).  
In general, we can assume that the presence of 
stars will attract bottom-up attention. 
Summarized by the theory of visual hierarchy 
(Faraday, 2000), information that stands out 
because of color, size, and/or graphical design, 
serves as an entry point in the information 
scanning process of decision makers (Djamasbi et 
al., 2012). This means that decision makers sort 
out visual key cues in the information field that is 
available to them, and implicitly attribute weights 
to these pieces of information for further 
evaluation in their overall decision (Djamasbi, 
2014).  
When a difference in stars exists, stakeholders are 
likely to notice and consider it immediately as 
relevant information for a decision. Therefore, a 
clear visual difference in stars is likely to also 
ignite a top-down control and enable the 
stakeholder to satisfy their top-down visual 
search pattern. While decision makers process the 
reputation information based on the difference in 
stars, they are likely to pay their visual attention 
to the reputation star rating (Theeuwes, 2010; 
Awh et al., 2012). As a result, differences in 
reputation stars will attract longer visual attention 
processing times based on the difference in stars. 
Therefore, our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: In a comparison of two 
objects including reputation star ratings, 
a difference in stars will result in more 
visual attention to the star rating 
information, compared to when there is 
no difference in reputation stars. 
Building on the rationale for Hypothesis 1, we 
then focus on what happens with visual attention 
to other types of information as a result of 
differences in stars. This allows us to better 
understand whether reputation star ratings draw 
away attention from other, non-reputation 
information. We rely on ecological rationality 
theory to explain how respondents attribute 
importance to reputation star ratings, and how a 
difference in stars could reduce perceived value 
of other available information – and thus less 
visual attention (Smith, 2003; Todd & Brighton, 
2016). Ecological rationality theory states that 
humans draw on a broad set of decision 
mechanisms and trade off the expected effort and 
outcome, depending on their specific contextual 
goals and the importance of those goals 
(Gigerenzer, 2008; Smith, 2003). Such trade-offs 
help people deal efficiently with various types of 
information at once (Gigerenzer & Goldstein 
1996).  A crucial argument in ecological 
rationality theory is that conscious human beings 
continuously and recurrently evaluate the context 
in which they make decisions and the information 
available for the decision. Based on that 
evaluation, decision makers episodically 
determine how much cognitive effort they are 
willing to additionally attribute to reach a final 
decision. 
For this study, the top-down element of visual 
attention to reputation star information is based 
on the assertion that a difference in stars, either 
partially or completely, provides the necessary 
information for decision makers to choose the 
best object. This means a difference in stars has 
certain informational value for the decision 
maker in the decision process. Therefore, and 
according to ecological rationality theory, when a 
difference in stars is observed, decision makers 
might attribute more importance to the reputation 
star rating and perceive the non-reputation 
information as less relevant and pay less visual 
attention to it.  
From this perspective, reputation star ratings and 
other reputation-related information can also 
have a detrimental role in the decision maker’s 
use of information by potentially drawing away 
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attention from other non-reputation information. 
The following two reasons explain this trade-off. 
First, reputation often functions as a simplified 
summary of a broad range of potentially relevant 
elements in the decision making process (Dalal & 
Bonaccio, 2010; Fuller et al., 2007; Kim et al., 
2008; Puncheva, 2008). This means decision 
makers see reputation-reporting metrics as a 
proxy for overall quality or performance of a 
product, service, or organization. Reliance on 
heuristic information signals like reputation star 
ratings is a rationally efficient approach when 
quality and performance are multi-dimensional, 
subjective, and opaque (Gigerenzer, 2008; Park 
& Nicolau, 2015). 
Second, reputation is the socially constructed set 
of expectations that multiple stakeholders hold 
about an object or person and that they take into 
account for their decisions, such as buying a 
product, recommending a service, or donating to 
a non-profit (Michel & Rieunier, 2012; Mishina 
et al., 2012). Hence, the social dimension of 
reputation, or the fact that reputation is mainly 
related to what several others have experienced, 
provides decision makers with additional, 
indirect information that can justify a reduction of 
one’s own mental efforts – for example by paying 
less attention to other available information – 
while still expecting to make a good decision 
(Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009).  
The reliance on reputation ratings and the 
reduced attention to non-reputation information 
might be particularly relevant in situations 
typified by asymmetric information (Puncheva, 
2008; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). In a highly 
marketized and digitized era where information is 
often sought online, individuals often forego in-
person, physical interactions. For example, 
Weigelt and Camerer (1988) assert that 
consumers cannot distinguish between high- and 
low-quality goods before consumption, and 
therefore question whether producers are able to 
credibly convey quality. This, again, reinforces 
the importance of reputation information. While 
individuals can use reputation as a screening 
strategy, they do so with imperfect or incomplete 
information (Connelly et al., 2011; Kivetz & 
Simonson, 2000; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). 
Absent perfect or complete information, the 
individual is likely to engage in some risk when 
choosing by placing her trust in the limited 
information available, or potentially conflicting 
information when information is available 
through multiple channels (e.g. reputation 
systems such as Yelp, Better Business Bureau, 
etc.) (Fuller et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2008). In lieu 
of direct experience, individuals are likely to 
screen available choices in order to make the best 
decision for them, forming trusting beliefs based 
on what they know from the reputation 
information (Fuller et al., 2007; Puncheva, 2008). 
Where ratings are similar, it is plausible that 
information seekers and decision makers will go 
beyond the reputation star ratings for more 
contextual information. Where ratings starkly 
differ, it is likely that the individual may accept 
the better or higher rated option to increase the 
likelihood of a better personal pay-off. In other 
words, the trade-off between expected effort and 
outcome causes the individual to place limited 
attention to contextual information, if the 
difference in reputation star ratings helps to make 
a decision.  
Due to the specific nature of reputation and 
reputation-related metrics in combination with 
this ecological rationality perspective, we expect:  
Hypothesis 2: In a comparison of two 
objects including reputation star ratings, 
a difference in stars will result in less 
visual attention to other available, non-
reputation information (compared to a 
situation with no difference in stars). 
Our hypotheses focus on the fact that a difference 
in stars will lead to more visual attention to 
reputation star information, and to less visual 
attention to non-reputation information. The 
combined interpretation of the results for both 
hypotheses can inform us how visual attention 
switches between types of information. In the 
case of both hypotheses being supported – and 
regardless of whether a difference in stars 
changes the attention duration to any type of 
information – we can observe a change in the 
overall attention pattern as a result of a difference 
in stars, with less relative attention to other 
available information. We must note that we are 
interested in how the attention of decision makers 
changes among different types of information 
that are available and compared across the object, 
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and thus, the hypotheses do not focus on the 
object that will be preferred as a result of a 
difference in star ratings, or which object receives 
more or less visual attention. However, we 
provide a complementary analysis for the latter to 
frame our study in the larger body of literature on 
visual attention.  
EXPERIMENT 
Experimental design 
The design of this study is consistent with the 
ethical standards of the experiments laboratory of 
the Faculty of Business, Economics, and Social 
Sciences at the University of Hamburg (WISO 
laboratory). Before entering the laboratory, 
students were informed that the study involved 
eye-tracking analysis, a mechanism by which eye 
movements are detected to focus on specific areas 
on a computer screen where information may be 
displayed. All respondents were informed during 
the completion of their consent forms about the 
general purpose of the experiment and the 
voluntary and anonymous nature of their 
participation.  
All respondents completed a maximum of three 
calibration rounds to adjust the eye-tracking 
system (Tobii Pro X2-60 eyetracker) for the 
information displayed on a 24-inch computer 
screen. This calibration contained an initial basic 
task where respondents were asked to focus on 
five dots that appear in sequence on different 
places on the screen. In doing so, the eye-tracking 
recording can be matched with what is seen on 
the screen, and before continuing the recording 
for the actual experiment, it can be determined 
whether the eye-tracking recording is functioning 
properly. This is a standard step to improve data 
quality in all eye-tracking experiments conducted 
in the WISO laboratory of the University of 
Hamburg. When the calibration did not work, we 
asked respondents to do another round. No more 
than three attempts were needed for any of the 
respondents. After the calibration, the 
participants started with a computer survey in 
which the experimental treatment was embedded. 
This survey was conducted with Qualtrics 
Surveys. 
Our experiment focused explicitly on testing the 
hypotheses formulated, so that only a difference 
in reputation star ratings was altered between 
treatment groups in which participants were 
randomly assigned and all other available 
information and its location on the screen were 
kept constant. Mainly concerned about potential 
threats to (external) validity for eye tracking 
studies (Orquin & Holmqvist, 2018), we focused 
on this specific causal element, and with a 
sufficient sample size. As a result, our design 
does not allow for extensive exploration of other 
potential moderating variables. 
Framing and decision 
The experiment started with an introduction and 
decision task, which was as follows: “On the 
following page you will find information from 
two social profit organizations. Please choose the 
organization you would like to support the most 
(e.g. through social media endorsement, 
donations and/or volunteering).” On the next 
page, the participants then received information 
about the two organizations, accompanied with 
the specific direction: “Please select the 
organization you prefer.” The two organizational 
fact sheets were presented next to each other with 
basic information about (1) organizational 
mission, (2) social impact, expressed with a 
reputation star rating, (3) number of volunteers, 
and (4) annual budget. Organization A was 
always presented on the left, while Organization 
B was always presented on the right. Only the 
amount of stars was altered left or right on the 
screen. Figure A1 in the Appendix gives an 
overview of these fact sheets and how they were 
presented to the two treatment groups.  
All respondents were randomly assigned to one 
of two groups (based on the embedded 
randomization mechanism in Qualtrics Surveys). 
In the first group (Treatment group 1; n = 61), 
both organizations had an equal star rating (4 out 
of 5 stars). In the second group (Treatment group 
2; n = 60), there was a difference in stars (one 
organization had 1 star and the other had 5 stars, 
out of 5). The second group was further split up 
into a group where Organization A had more stars 
than Organization B (n = 30), and another group 
where Organization B had more stars (n = 30). 
This means that for the group with unequal stars, 
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50 percent of the respondents saw more stars on 
the left, and 50 percent saw more stars on the 
right. This was done because visual attention 
patterns often suffer from a reading bias, meaning 
that information on top and left are more 
frequently consulted (at least in societies with a 
language that is read from left to right) 
(Djamasbi, Siegel, & Tullis, 2011; Dallas, Liu, & 
Ubel, 2019). We controlled for this reading bias 
by design to ensure that in a situation with 
unequal stars (Hypothesis 1), a difference in 
visual attention can be attributed to the 
mechanisms explained in our theory section and 
not to the specific location of information on the 
screen (e.g. left versus right). With respect to 
other design features of our information sheet, we 
also refer to them in the next subsection where we 
discuss visual attention as our dependent 
variable. 
Respondents could choose their preferred 
organization by clicking the tick box underneath 
the respective organizational fact sheet. 
Respondents could consult all available 
information for an unlimited amount of time 
before making a decision and moving to the next 
survey page (Orquin & Holmqvist, 2018).  
Both organizations were fictitious to avoid biases 
based on prior knowledge and experience of a 
known organization that might have influenced 
respondents’ visual attention and final decision. 
We chose the particular setting for the following 
three reasons. First, social profit organizations are 
characterized by the fact that their performance is 
often (1) very subjective, i.e. highly dependent on 
stakeholder perceptions, (2) is multi-dimensional, 
(3) hard to quantify, and (4) information about 
organizational performance is often highly 
asymmetric (Lecy, Schmitz, & Swedlund, 2012; 
Willems, Boenigk, & Jegers, 2014). This means 
that the organization’s effectiveness reputation, 
i.e. the social construction of what people think 
their social value is for society, often plays a 
major role in how stakeholders make decisions 
about such organizations. Given the theoretical 
focus on the socio-cognitive nature of reputation 
makes this setting highly interesting, particularly 
for Hypothesis 2.  
Second, we believe this setting has high practical 
relevance, as many social profit organizations 
struggle in communicating performance and 
effectiveness to broad audiences, especially as 
they are increasingly pushed toward reporting 
more quantifiable outputs (Willems, Jegers, & 
Faulk, 2016). Answering our research question in 
this particular context can inform nonprofit 
managers and policy makers whether the 
evolution towards reporting social impact 
performance based more on single metrics is a 
good evolution, as it might reduce stakeholder 
attention to other relevant information, that, in 
particular, might be relevant in a context where 
multi-dimensional performance is a core element.  
Third, as we rely on a student sample (see the 
following subsection), the question on which 
social profit organization they like most is a 
realistic question they can answer that is neither 
too hypothetical nor in an unrealistic setting. This 
is why we provided additional clarification on 
why we asked their preference and added the 
context of potentially supporting the 
organization. In this context, we rely on the 
extensive body of theoretical and empirical 
literature that shows how positive attitudes are a 
prerequisite for actual supporting behavior 
(Bendapudi, Singh, & Bendapudi, 1996; Babin & 
Bruns, 1997). Nevertheless, for our design and 
the hypotheses we test, we want to clarify that the 
focus is not on testing the effect of our treatment 
on actual behavior, but that the goal was to give 
the participants a decision task in which they 
consult all the available information.  
Participants 
Students from the University of Hamburg were 
invited to participate in the laboratory experiment 
in which they were paid 10 euro-per-hour. We 
aimed for about 60 students per treatment group 
(in our main two-group comparison). This means 
we were able to discover a medium effect size, in 
case a true effect exists (based on the following a 
priori assumptions: sample size calculation for a 
two group ANOVA test, Cohen’s f = 0.25, i.e. 
Cohen’s d = 0.50 medium effect size, β = 0.80 
and α= 0.05) (Champely, 2018). In total, 129 
respondents participated, and after data quality 
checks, 121 responses could be used for this 
experiment (74 identified as female, and the 
average age was 25.87, s.d. = 4.62). In the other 
eight cases, some eye-tracking data were missing 
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(for example, participants wore glasses or looked 
away from the computer screen for too long 
during the experiment) or were not properly 
calibrated with questionnaire data.  
Variables 
The focus of the analysis is on visual attention to 
the information in the organizational fact sheets, 
with special attention on two variables: (1) visual 
attention to reputation star rating, and (2) visual 
attention to the other, non-reputation information. 
Visual attention is operationalized as the total 
fixation time (in seconds) that respondents focus 
on particular areas of interest (AOIs) in the 
organizational fact sheets. We applied the Tobii 
Studio default settings: average eye selection, I-
VT filter (velocity threshold of 30 degrees per 
second), merged adjacent fixations of a 
maximum time between fixations of 75 
milliseconds, and maximum angle between 
fixations 0.5 degrees; and a minimum fixation 
duration of 60 milliseconds. Other studies 
suggest longer minimum fixation durations, 
while Orquin and Holmqvist (2018) suggest not 
too long of a minimum fixation duration to have 
sufficient data quality. 
Orquin, Ashby and Clarke (2016) point out that 
no standardized procedures exist to design 
information sheets or mark AOIs within them. 
Using their suggestions, the organizational fact 
sheets were designed in such a way to ensure that 
different information pieces had sufficient white 
space between them to avoid overlapping fixation 
distributions and thus limit the risk of false 
positive fixation registrations. Four AOIs were 
designed and placed on each organizational fact 
sheet. An overview of the AOIs and how they 
were combined, are presented in Figure A2 in the 
Appendix. The sum of visual attention to 
reputation star information constitutes the first 
main variable, and the sum of visual attention to 
the all other information constitutes the second 
main variable. Table A1 in the Appendix reports 
both variables for the overall sample and per 
treatment group. Respondents consulted both 
organizational fact sheets on average for 9.146 
seconds (s.d. = 5.013), with a minimum of 0.92 
seconds, and a maximum of 26.75 seconds. On 
average, respondents looked 4.683 seconds (s.d. 
= 2.862) at the reputation star info and 4.464 
seconds (s.d. = 3.409) at the non-reputation 
information.  
Furthermore, we examined and reported only on 
visual attention, measured as total fixation time. 
While various eye-tracking software applications 
provide a multitude of other eye-movement 
metrics, we focused on a single metric most 
suited for our particular research question. This is 
based on the methodological recommendation 
from Orquin and Holmqvist (2018) to avoid the 
analysis of too many eye-tracking metrics in a 
single study, as it is a threat to statistical validity 
(mainly multiple comparisons problem, 
especially due to restricted statistical power in 
limited sample sizes for eye-tracking studies).  
Considering the other potential validity threats of 
eye tracking studies (Orquin & Holmqvist, 2018), 
we designed our experiment and conducted our 
analysis in a way that does not directly compare 
visual attention to different types of information 
(e.g. a direct comparison of written information 
versus pictured information). Instead, we test 
how the visual attention distribution between 
reputation star ratings information and non-
reputation information changes, as a result of a 
difference in stars (between-subjects design).  
We test how this distribution changes between 
types of information across the objects that are 
compared by the decision makers. We start with 
the comparison of the total visual attention to 
reputation star information of both organizations 
(sum of total fixation time in areas AOI 3 and 
AOI 4, in Figure A2 in the Appendix) with the 
total visual attention to the other areas (AOI 1, 
AOI 2, AOI 5, AOI 6, AOI 7, and AOI 8, in 
Figure A2 in the Appendix, also summarized). 
This means that AOI 1, AOI 2, AOI 5, AOI 6, 
AOI 7, and AOI 8 were kept constant for all 
respondents of both treatment groups, and the 
absolute visual attention to these areas captures 
all the potential effects that might explain 
differences in visual attention for specific AOIs 
(explained in more detail in Orquin & Holmqvist, 
2018, p. 1650), while a relative difference 
between treatment groups is a result of the single 
experimental manipulation in this study.   
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Results  
Testing the hypotheses: visual attention 
To understand whether reputation star ratings are 
consulted as complementary or substitute 
information, we analyzed the differences between 
visual attention placed to the respective AOIs. 
We consider it a complementary consultation if 
there is no significant difference in fixation time 
of the respective AOIs, and a substitute 
consultation, if respondents placed significantly 
less visual attention to the non-reputation 
information.  
Figure 1: Visual attention in seconds to reputation star information and other 
information. 
 
Note: Density plots (Wickham, 2016) report the relative frequencies (in percentages; vertical axis) of 
observations for visual attention (in seconds; Horizontal axis) to the reputation star information (part A) 
and to the non-reputation information (part B). The line covering the green area gives the relative 
frequencies of observations for absolute visual attention that a respondent in Treatment group 1 spent on 
a type of information (No difference in stars). The line covering the red area, gives the relative frequencies 
of observations for absolute visual attention (in seconds) that a respondent in Treatment group 2 spent on 
a type of information.  For part A, the difference in visual attention to reputation star information between 
treatment groups is significant (Hypothesis 1: Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 7.6923, df = 1, p = 0.0055). For part B, the 
difference in visual attention to other available, non-reputation star information between treatment groups 
is not significant (Hypothesis 2: Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 0.83723, df = 1, p = 0.3602). 
10 
Figure 1 reports with density plots (Wickham, 
2016) the relative frequencies of observations for 
visual attention (in seconds) to the reputation star 
information (Figure 1A) and to the non-
reputation information (Figure 1B). The lines 
give the relative frequencies of observations (in 
percentages) for absolute visual attention (in 
seconds) that a respondent spent on a piece of 
information. For Figure 1A, this is visual 
attention to reputation star ratings; For Figure 1B, 
this is visual attention to the other available, non-
reputation information. We test the difference in 
averages between the two treatment groups with 
a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test, as it is most 
appropriate for a multi-group comparison of a 
variable with a non-normal distribution (see 
Figure 1). The group of respondents with a 
difference in reputation stars (red area, in Figure 
1) on average spent significantly more attention 
on the reputation star rating (Table A1 in the 
Appendix: Group 2 mean = 5.49) than the group 
of respondents with equal reputation stars (Table 
A1 in the Appendix: Group 1 mean = 3.88) 
(Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 7.6923, df = 1, p = 0.0055). 
As visible in Figure 1A, on average, respondents 
consulted the reputation star ratings longer when 
they reported an actual difference, i.e. the flatter 
but longer shape of the density curve covering the 
red area for Treatment group 2, compared to the 
density curve covering the green area for the 
respondents in Treatment group 1. Hence, 
Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
A difference in reputation stars, however, did not 
result in more or less visual attention to the non-
reputation information (Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 
0.83723, df = 1, p = 0.3602; Group 1 mean = 3.94, 
Group 2 mean = 5.00). This is evident in Figure 
1B, as the density curves and areas are mainly 
overlapping for both treatment groups. In other 
words, the distributions of visual attention to the 
other available information are not significantly 
different as a result of the experimental treatment. 
This suggests that a difference in reputation stars 
is consulted as additional, complementary 
information, rather than as substitute information. 
Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
Complementary analysis 1: a further 
exploration of visual attention to the 
subgroups in Treatment group 2 
We can better understand the change in visual 
attention patterns as a result of our main treatment 
by further exploring differences between 
Treatment group 1, and the two subgroups of 
Treatment group 2. We report in Figures 4, for 
Treatment group 1 (equal amount of stars) and the 
two subgroups of Treatment group 2 (unequal 
amount of stars) group means and distributions 
for visual attention to different types of 
information. We use bean plots (Kampstra, 2008) 
or pirate plots (Phillips, 2017) to provide this 
additional information. Such plots give good 
insights in group means, but also in the 
(difference between) distributions of each group. 
The black horizontal line in each group reports 
the group mean (visual attention to an AOI or a 
combination of AOIs). The box around the mean 
line reports the 95% confidence intervals, and the 
(colored) density curves/clouds give insights into 
the distribution of observations within each 
group. This is relevant, as the data is not normally 
distributed. The wider the density cloud in a 
group, the more observations occurred for the 
corresponding value on the vertical axis. As a 
result, these plots not only make it clear how 
group means differ as a result of different 
experimental treatment groups and sub-groups, 
but also how internal distributions might differ.  
Figure A3 in the Appendix, Part I reports visual 
attention to all reputation information (for both 
organizations combined), based on a three-fold 
division: (1) Organization A has more stars, (2) 
both organizations have equal stars, and (3) 
Organization B has more stars. Both sub-groups 
of Treatment 2, i.e. a different number of stars, 
have a significant higher mean than Treatment 
group 1. This is an alternative way of presenting 
the results for Hypothesis 1. For the three-group 
comparison, the Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared test 
shows a significant difference between groups (χ2 
= 8.7928, df = 2, p = 0.012; Group mean ‘A and 
B have equal stars’ = 3.88, Group mean ‘A has 
more stars’ = 5.75, Group mean ‘B has more 
stars’ = 5.24). However, this additional test and 
graph suggests that, for example, a reading bias, 
where decision makers spend more visual 
attention on information on the left side of an 
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information sheet (Djamasbi et al., 2011), did not 
interfere with presenting more stars on the left 
compared to presenting them on the right. This 
means that more visual attention to reputation star 
ratings as a result of a difference in stars 
(Hypothesis 1) is not influenced by their specific 
location on the screen, at least from a left-versus-
right perspective, keeping the top-versus-bottom 
element constant across all treatment groups and 
subgroups. 
Figure A3 in the Appendix, Part II reports for the 
same three groups the visual attention to non-
reputation information. This is an alternative 
presentation of the results for Hypothesis 2, but 
with a distinction for the subgroups of Treatment 
group 2. No significant difference is observed 
among the three groups (Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 
0.88359, df = 2, p-value = 0.6429; Group mean 
‘A and B have equal stars’ = 3.94, Group mean 
‘A has more stars’ = 5.25, Group mean ‘B has 
more stars’ = 4.75), indicating that there is no 
substituting effect of a difference in reputation 
star rating on other types of information (recall 
Hypothesis 2 is not supported). The higher means 
for both subgroups of Treatment group 2 suggest 
that there might be a tendency that a difference in 
stars triggers extra attention to the other available 
information, rather than drawing away attention 
from it. Before arriving at this conclusion, 
however, an alternative theoretical logic and 
more extensive testing is needed. 
Complementary analysis 2: Choosing the 
preferred organization and the relatedness 
with visual attention 
Figure A3 in the Appendix, Parts III and IV 
report, also with bean plots, the differences in 
visual attention to reputation star ratings, for 
Organization A and Organization B, respectively. 
By making the additional distinction per 
organization, we can explore in more detail how 
a difference in stars results in more or less 
attention to the actual choices. No significant 
differences are observed for attention to 
reputation information of Organization A (Figure 
A3 in the Appendix, Part III: Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 
2.114, df = 2, p-value = 0.3475; Group mean ‘A 
and B have equal stars’ = 2.31, Group mean ‘A 
has more stars’ = 2.65, Group mean ‘B has more 
stars’ = 3.04). However, a long density plot for 
the ‘Organization B has more stars’ group 
suggests that a tendency might exist for few stars 
attracting visual attention, rather than many stars. 
In other words, when Organization B has more 
stars than Organization A (and A fewer than B), 
people focus slightly more on the reputation star 
rating of Organization A. This effect is significant 
in the alternative combination (Figure A3 in the 
Appendix, Part IV) as visual attention to the star 
rating of Organization B is higher when 
Organization A has more stars, while 
Organization B has fewer (Kruskal-Wallis chi-
squared = 11.068, df = 2, p-value = 0.00395; 
Group mean ‘A and B have equal stars’ = 1.57, 
Group mean ‘A has more stars’ = 3.09, Group 
mean ‘B has more stars’ = 2.21). These results 
suggest that a lack of stars, rather than many stars 
attracts visual attention. We acknowledge that 
this preliminary finding is the result of a post-hoc 
exploration in a sample of limited size. It can, 
however, inform us on potential further directions 
to understand how a difference in stars influences 
overall attention patterns to all available 
information, and thus, more extensive testing is 
needed in the future.  
To further explore the relationship between visual 
attention to reputation star ratings and non-
reputation information, we report in Table A2 in 
the Appendix a set of four logistic generalized 
linear models with the choice of a preferred 
organization as the dependent variable 
(Organization A is preferred (value = 0) or 
Organization B (value = 1)). In these models, the 
choice for a preferred organization is explained, 
based on the experimental treatment and visual 
attention to different pieces of information. The 
comparison of these models can illuminate how 
visual attention to particular information 
potentially mediates the relationship between the 
experimental treatment (a difference in stars) and 
the final decision (which organization is 
preferred). It gives insight into the specific 
features of the design and setting we used, which 
is relevant to evaluate the generalizability of 
these findings. Again, this part of our analysis is 
complementary; previous studies had more 
appropriate designs to test this particular 
relationship. Visual attention on one hand and the 
final decision on the other do not necessarily 
relate unidirectionally to each other as cause and 
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effect. A substantial body of literature suggests 
that an initial decision is made during the 
information consultation process, and that further 
information consultation is a function of this 
preliminary first choice. For example, Fiedler & 
Glöckner (2012; 2015) argue that a preliminary 
decision is made at a certain point (even early on) 
and that later visual attention is the result of 
cognitive processes to further verify and support 
the decision. Thus, the analysis in Table A2 in the 
Appendix reports the correlation of the decision 
with visual attention, rather than a causal effect. 
Model 1 in Table A2 in the Appendix shows an 
overall significant tendency to prefer 
Organization B over A (0.454, p < 0.05), based 
on all the available information and when we do 
not specify (1) whether a difference in stars was 
presented and (2) which organization then had 
more or less stars than the other organization. 
This can be seen as a benchmark with which to 
compare the other models. Model 2 tests whether 
more or less stars influences the final choice that 
respondents make on their preferred organization, 
not taking visual attention into account. The non-
significant coefficients show that only the 
treatment in itself does not explain the choice for 
one of the two organizations. This means that the 
difference in stars is probably not the main 
decision criterion for most respondents and that a 
combination of all the available information is 
consulted to make a final decision. When 
focusing on visual attention to explain whether 
Organization B is preferred over Organization A 
(Models 3 and 4), there is a relationship between 
visual attention for the respective organizations 
and the choice made. More visual attention to 
Organization A is related to a lower likelihood to 
prefer Organization B (-0.503; p < 0.01 for 
attention to reputation information, and -0.272; p 
< 0.05 for attention to non-reputation 
information). More visual attention to 
Organization B, at least for non-reputation 
information, is related to a higher likeliness to 
choose Organization B (0.587; p < 0.01). While 
this analysis does not provide conclusive 
evidence for it, these findings are consistent with 
the idea that extra visual attention is given to the 
decision option that is the final choice (Fiedler & 
Glöckner, 2012; 2015). Therefore, when we 
combine the results of our main analysis and 
hypothesis testing with these complementary 
results, we assume that a difference in stars 
creates a partial change in the overall attention 
pattern, and that this pattern is the basis for the 
final decision of decision makers. 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
This study explored a primary research question 
of how a difference in reputation star ratings 
influences visual attention to the reputation star 
ratings, but also to non-reputation information. 
The utility of user experiences, based on either 
positive or negative interactions, and reported 
through reputation star ratings, has become 
increasingly important in the decision-making 
processes of individuals (e.g., Banerjee et al., 
2017; Jøsang et al., 2007). When individuals are 
asked to compare information between two 
choices, we observed through an experimentally 
manipulated difference in reputation star ratings 
that visual attention patterns are influenced. 
While previous experimental research has 
elucidated the relationship between information 
and decision making, this study has contributed 
more granular knowledge to how information 
may be utilized, and what variation in ratings 
attracts eye movement or visual attention 
(supporting for example Fehrenbacher & 
Djamasbi, 2017). We investigated preferences 
towards social profit organizations, as they often 
depend on positive reputations to attract 
resources, yet stakeholders face high information 
asymmetries to evaluate these organizations. As 
stated in the introduction, star ratings are a 
common way to demonstrate reputation despite 
limited information. Future research can and 
should investigate whether our findings are 
transferable to other contexts. 
This study reveals that reputation star ratings 
draw more visual attention to the stars when they 
report a clear difference, supporting Hypothesis 
1. This shows that a difference in star ratings 
provides relevant information for decision 
makers that extends their visual attention to the 
stars, indicating that they process the star ratings 
not only in an initial bottom-up process, but also 
in a top-down process (e.g., Theeuwes, 2010). 
The study also shows that reputation star ratings 
are not drawing away visual attention from non-
reputation information and stakeholders of social 
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profit organizations do not seem to perceive a 
difference in star ratings as a substitute of the 
non-reputation information. These findings 
contrast our initial expectation (Hypothesis 2) 
and indicate that despite the trade-offs in 
cognitive efforts that stakeholders make 
according to ecological rationality theory (e.g., 
Todd & Brighton, 2016), they do not evaluate the 
organization based on either reputation or non-
reputation information, but assess all information 
available.  
In contrast, our complementary analyses identify 
the need for further testing, verification, and 
elaboration of some new propositions. In fact, our 
results suggest (though not at a 5-percent 
significance level) that a difference in stars for a 
reputation star rating might also trigger more 
visual attention to the other available information 
(e.g. Figure A3 in the Appendix, Part IV). The 
difference in stars potentially works as a visual 
entry point (Faraday, 2000; Djamasbi, et al., 
2012; Djamasbi, 2014), triggering curiosity that 
leads to a more thorough information search. This 
proposition, however, needs to be more robustly 
tested in future research to have the potential to 
make stronger conclusions.  
Additionally, the results of our complementary 
analysis suggest that individuals are likelier to 
focus on a lack of stars, or poor reputation 
reviews, rather than higher reputation star ratings. 
The caveat, as was presented in our analysis, is 
that this attention does not signify a concrete 
cause and effect with regard to decision making. 
Our results are only indicative of where 
individuals place their attention, rather than any 
discrete predictive measures with regard to 
personal choice. The findings, however, are 
consistent with the idea that the choice that 
garners more individual attention is likelier the 
final choice of the individual.  
Limitations 
While our complementary analyses are a good 
basis to formulate further research avenues, 
identifying the limitations of this study can help 
set forth new directions for further verification 
and falsification. First, we have only 
hypothesized and tested a particular effect of a 
difference in stars, which is mainly visual 
attention to all available information. Our choice 
for a robust analysis of two related hypotheses 
enables us to say with more certainty something 
about the relation between reputation star ratings 
and visual attention, but we remained rather 
exploratory on how that, in turn, influences the 
actual final decision. We reported this in 
complementary analyses, but given our setting 
and design, it remains difficult to make assertions 
on the causal relation between visual attention 
and the final decision between objects. Other 
attention measures, along with complementary 
methods such as discrete choice experiments, 
interviews in which choices are explained in 
retrospect, or even longitudinal diary studies can 
potentially provide richer information to 
complement the preliminary findings and 
interpretations of this study. For example, the 
order of fixations and comparison processes over 
time (e.g. in Djamasbi et al., 2012; Djamasbi, 
2014) would require substantially larger sample 
sizes, but could also substantially contribute to a 
better understanding of the causal and subsequent 
steps in how a difference in reputation stars 
influences visual attention. 
Second, we chose a particular and hypothetical 
setting where we asked students to indicate which 
social profit organization they most prefer. We 
believe such a setting is highly relevant given the 
crucial role of reputation for social profit 
organizations and because such a question is 
realistic for a student sample. We acknowledge 
that this is a particular setting and specific 
decision task, and that caution is warranted when 
generalizations are made to other contexts, such 
as buying products or services. 
Third, we acknowledge that many aspects might 
influence visual attention, such as the location of 
information, the way it is presented, and what 
concrete facts the information reports. We kept 
factors constant where we did not formulate 
formal hypotheses. We subdivided one of the 
treatment groups in order to balance the 
visualization of stars on the left and right sides to 
avoid reader bias that could have interfered with 
the testing of our hypotheses. However, 
reputation star ratings themselves can come in 
many forms and shapes, and so can all other types 
of information. Its location and graphical design 
can also influence visual attention patterns. As 
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such, further research should continue to test the 
hypotheses with other types of reputation stars, in 
other orders, and with a variety of other available 
information. In doing so, important moderating 
and/or confounding variables can be identified 
and tested in a way that potentially mitigate the 
hypothesized effects. This is particularly relevant 
to further exploration from a practical point of 
view, as it not only can give valuable insight on 
the value of reputation star ratings, but also on 
how they can be best designed and for what 
purposes. Eventually, this could lead to a more 
holistic framework or a set of practical guidelines 
that give a more complete insight in how different 
types of reputation star ratings can be best used 
by decision system developers. Potentially, 
different types of star ratings should be used 
depending on a broad range of contextual factors, 
such as the nature of other information available, 
the purpose of the types of information that is 
provided, and the type of decision to be made. 
Finally, we focus only on a comparison of two 
objects in a controlled environment. As 
previously noted, this helped in improving the 
internal validity of our study (Orquin & 
Holmqvist, 2018), but given the multitude of 
options that are often presented on online 
platforms, this two-object choice lacks external 
validity. Therefore, further research should seek 
to find a good balance between internal and 
external validity when trading off highly realistic 
settings on one hand (Rayner, 2009) with 
sufficient statistical robustness on the other 
(Orquin & Holmqvist, 2018).  
Practical implications 
The main implication of our study is for decision 
support developers. Our preliminary results 
suggest that reputation star ratings are not 
considered as substitute information for other 
available information, even in a context where 
reputation is a crucial element of evaluation 
objects (i.e. social profit organizations). This 
means that reputation star ratings are consulted as 
additional information, and potentially trigger 
more attention to all information, including 
additional, non-reputation information. Decision 
system developers could therefore make sure that 
they do not rely just on positive star ratings but 
provide detailed information about the object, so 
stakeholders can draw on a variety of information 
to evaluate and make a decision, particularly 
when the amount of stars differs from other 
(competitive) objects.  
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APPENDIX - Figure A1: Overview of organizational comparison, based on treatment groups and 
subgroups (equal or unequal stars in the comparison) 
Group 1: Equal stars (n = 61) 
  
Group 2: Two variations of unequal stars 
“A has more stars” (n =30) 
  
“B has more stars” (n =30) 
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APPENDIX - Figure A2: Areas of interest (AOIs), capturing visual attention to reputation star 
ratings and to other available, non-reputation information. 
 
Note: The dependent variable for Hypothesis 1, i.e. visual attention to reputation star ratings, was the sum 
of the total fixation time on AOI 3 and AOI 4. The dependent variable for Hypothesis 2, i.e. visual attention 
to other available, non-reputation information, was the sum of the total fixation time on AOI 1, AOI 2, AOI 
5, AOI 6, AOI 7, and AOI 8. 
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APPENDIX - Figure A3: Visual attention to reputation and non-reputation information: Comparing 
means, 95%-confidence intervals, and density per treatment group. 
I. Visual attention to all reputation information: 
Comparing means, 95%-confidence intervals, 
and density per treatment group. 
II. Visual attention to all non-reputation 
information: Comparing means, 95%-
confidence intervals, and density per treatment 
group. 
  
III. Visual attention to reputation information of 
Organization A: Comparing means, 95%-
confidence intervals, and density per treatment 
group. 
IV. Visual attention to reputation information 
of Organization B: Comparing means, 95%-
confidence intervals, and density per treatment 
group. 
  
Note: For Treatment group 1 (Organization A and B have equal stars), and the two subgroups of 
Treatment group 2 (Organization A has more stars than B; Organization B has more stars than A), group 
means and distributions for visual attention (in seconds; vertical axis) are reported, based on a bean plot 
(Kampstra, 2008; Phillips, 2017). The black horizontal line in each group reports the group mean. The 
box around the mean line report the 95% confidence intervals for the mean value, and the density 
curves/clouds give insights into the distribution of observations within each group. The wider the density 
cloud in a group, the more observations for the corresponding value on the vertical axis. 
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APPENDIX - Table A1: Descriptive statistics for visual attention, overall, and per treatment group. 
 
  
Dependent variable 1:  
Visual attention to 
reputation star ratings 
Dependent variable 2:  
Visual attention to 
non-reputation information 
  N / n mean s.d. min. max. mean s.d. min. max. 
All 121 4.68 2.86 0.00 14.11 4.46 3.41 0.00 15.64 
Treatment Group 1 (No difference in stars) 
 A and B have equal stars 61 3.88 2.01 0.43 10.03 3.94 2.56 0.50 12.30 
Treatment Group 2 (A difference in stars) 
 Group 2 (overall) 60 5.49 3.35 0.00 14.11 5.00 4.05 0.00 15.64 
 Subgroup: ‘A has more stars’ 30 5.75 3.30 0.00 13.14 5.25 4.39 0.00 15.64 
 Subgroup: ‘B has more stars’ 30 5.24 3.44 0.92 14.11 4.75 3.74 0.40 14.97 
Note: Values are expressed in seconds, i.e. total fixation time on areas of interest (AOIs) that contained 
reputation-star ratings for both Organization A and B (Dependent variable 1: Hypothesis 1), or non-
reputation information for both Organization A and B (Dependent variable 2: Hypothesis 2). 
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APPENDIX - Table A2: Complementary analysis; Explaining organizational choice based on 
treatment (difference in reputation stars), and visual attention to each organization. 
 Prefer Organization B over Organization A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
0.454* 
(0.187) 
0.718** 
(0.273) 
1.007* 
(0.446) 
1.174* 
(0.469) 
Treatment group 1: Org A and Org B 
have equal stars (reference category) 
    
Treatment group 2 (subgroup a): Org. A 
has more stars (dummy) 
 -0.851 
(0.456) 
 -1.231
* 
(0.554) 
Treatment group 2 (subgroup b): Org. B 
has more stars (dummy) 
 -0.171 
(0.467) 
 -0.109 
(0.535) 
Visual attention to the reputation-star 
rating of Org. A 
  -0.416
* 
(0.162) 
-0.503** 
(0.177) 
Visual attention to the reputation-star 
rating of Org. B 
  0.083 
(0.147) 
0.234 
(0.164) 
Visual attention to the other available, 
non-reputation info of Org. A 
  -0.307
* 
(0.129) 
-0.272* 
(0.132) 
Visual attention to the other available, 
non-reputation info of Org. B 
  0.582
** 
(0.194) 
0.587** 
(0.201) 
Observations 121 121 121 121 
Log Likelihood -80.833 -79.035 -70.594 -67.853 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 163.666 164.069 151.188 149.706 
Method: Generalized linear logistic regression 
Dependent variable is dummy-coded: “Prefer Organization B over Organization A” (= 1), 
“Prefer Organization A over Organization B” (= 0). 
Standard errors between parentheses 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
